

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07 L-03 ACDA-05

NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00

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INFO CINCLANT

USLOSACLANT

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USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 5636

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, MNUC, NPG

SUBJ: NPG: CNI: MESSAGES OF WARNING

REF: A. USNATO 5559 DTG 111430Z OCT 75

B. STATE 237050 DTG 040052Z OCT 75

THERE FOLLOWS BELOW THE COVER LETTER AND TEXT OF A DRAFT PERMREP REPORT ENTITLED COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTIONS - MESSAGES OF WARNING. NPG STAFF GROUP HELD FINAL DISCUSSION OF THE DRAFT ON OCT. 10 (REF A), AND WE RECOMMEND APPROVAL. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON COMMENTS AND/OR APPROVAL OF THE DRAFT BY OCTOBER 29. BEGIN TEXT OF COVER LETTER:

AT THEIR MEETING IN MONTEREY IN JUNE 1975 NPG MINISTERS, AFTER HAVING DISCUSSED A STUDY(1) AND A PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES' REPORT(2) ON COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTIONS (CNI), DECIDED(3) THAT WORK ON THIS SUBJECT SHOULD CONTINUE. THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES, IN RESPONSE TO THE MINISTERIAL REQUEST, AGREED TO SUBMIT TO MINISTERS, AT THEIR MEETING TO BE HELD IN HAMBURG IN NOVEMBER, A REPORT DEALING WITH THE QUESTION OF SECRET

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WHETHER NATO, IN CASE OF CONFLICT, SHOULD SEND MESSAGES OF WARNING TO THE ENEMY PRIOR TO A NUCLEAR WEAPON USE. ATTACHED IS A DRAFT REPORT ON THIS SUBJECT THAT THE NPG (STAFF GROUP) HAS PREPARED FOR NPG PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES' CONSIDERATION.

2. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES ARE INVITED TO CONSIDER THE ATTACHED DRAFT AT THEIR NEXT MEETING (29TH OCTOBER), WITH A VIEW TO AGREEING ON A REPORT TO BE CIRCULATED SHORTLY THEREAFTER AS A MINISTERIAL AGENDA DOCUMENT.

(1) NPG/STUY/46, 20TH SEPTEMBER, 1974

(2) NPG/D/(74)10, 15TH OCTOBER, 1974

(3) NPG/D(75/4, 23RD JULY, 1975, PARAGRAPH 13. END TEXT.

BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT REPORT:

#### I. PURPOSE

1. THIS REPORT EXAMINES THE QUESTION WHETHER NATO, IN CASE OF CONFLICT, SHOULD SEND MESSAGES OF WARNING TO THE ENEMY PRIOR TO A NUCLEAR WEAPON USE.

#### II. BACKGROUND

2. AT THEIR MEETING IN ANKARA IN MAY 1973 THE NPG MINISTERS INVITED(1) THE NPG PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO INITIATE A STUDY ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTIONS (CNI) TO AN ENEMY(2), PREPARED BY THE NPG STAFF GROUP, WAS FORWARDED TO MINISTERS, TOGETHER WITH A PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES' REPORT(3) AT THEIR MONTEREY MEETING IN JUNE 1975. THESE DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED IN DEPTH THE COMMUNICATION THAT NATO MIGHT CHOOSE TO MAKE IN SUPPORT OF A DECISION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SELECTIVELY. AT MONTEREY, THE NPG MINISTERS TOOK NOTE OF THESE DOCUMENTS AND AGREED(4) WITH THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES' RECOMMENDATION THAT WORK ON THE SUBJECT SHOULD CONTINUE.

3. THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES' REPORT ON THE CNI STUDY IDENTIFIED IN PARTICULAR TWO QUESTIONS:

(A) WHETHER MESSAGES OF WARNING SHOULD BE SENT PRIOR TO THE NUCLEAR USE DECISION OR WHETHER SUCH MESSAGES MIGHT BE SENT AFTER A DECISION BUT PRIOR TO ACTUAL USE; AND

(B) WHETHER IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO DEVELOP A SET OF PROCEDURES TO ASSIST CNI CONSULTATION.

(1) NPG/D(73)7, 21ST MAY, 1973, PARAGRAPH 16

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(2) NPG/STUDY/46, 20TH SEPTEMBER, 1974

(3) NPG/D(74)10, 15TH OCTOBER, 1974

(4) NPG/D(75)4, 23RD JULY, 1975, PARAGRAPH 13

THIS REPORT ADDRESSES THE FIRST OF THOSE TWO QUESTIONS AND IT SHOULD BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ABOVE-MENTIONED DOCUMENTS, TO WHICH IT FORMS A COMPANION PIECE. THE QUESTION OF PROCEDURES IS BEING CONSIDERED SEPARATELY.

#### III. MESSAGES OF WARNING DEFINITIONS

4. THE CNI STUDY(1) CONSIDERED MESSAGES WHICH WOULD BE SENT AFTER A NUCLEAR POWER DECISION HAD BEEN REACHED AND NOT

SPECIFICALLY MAKING THE USE DEPENDENT ON THE ENEMY'S REACTION. SUCH MESSAGES WOULD BE ESSENTIALLY OF INFORMATION AND CLARIFICATION, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD ALSO CONTAIN A WARNING, EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT, OF FURTHER USE. THE PRESENT PAPER CONSIDERS MESSAGES WHERE THE WARNING ASPECT PREDOMINATES. THIS MAY BE IN INSTANCES WHERE THE MESSAGE IS SENT BEFORE ANY SPECIFIC DECISION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, OR WHERE AFTER A NUCLEAR POWER DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN, THE ENEMY IS WARNED THAT IT WILL BE IMPLEMENTED UNLESS HE TAKES THE ACTION DESIRED BY THE ALLIANCE.

#### WARSAW PACT COURSES OF ACTION

5. THE STUDY ON WARSAW PACT POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SUGGESTS(2) THAT THERE MAY BE TWO MAIN COURSES OF ACTION WHICH SOVIET LEADERS MAY PURSUE IN A CRISIS: A DOCTRINAL AND RIGID ONE OR A MORE FLEXIBLE AND CAUTIOUS ONE. BY A DOCTRINAL AND RIGID APPROACH IS MEANT THAT SOVIET WARTIME BEHAVIOUR WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THEIR ENUNCIATED DOCTRINE AND POLICY, AND THERE IS MUCH EVIDENCE THAT SUPPORTS THIS POSSIBILITY, WHICH WOULD RESULT IN WIDESCALE NUCLEAR RESPONSE TO NATO INITIAL USE. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, A NUMBER OF FACTORS WHICH SUGGEST THAT THERE WOULD BE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO LIMIT THE CONFLICT AND/OR TO END IT THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS(3). ALTHOUGH THIS "FLEXIBLE AND CAUTIOUS" APPROACH IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE OF PRECISE DEFINITION, IT CAN BE BEST DESCRIBED FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS PAPER AS A RANGE OF POSSIBLE SOVIET ACTIONS THAT WOULD BE GOVERNED BY A MANIFEST CONCERN ABOUT THE RISKS OF ESCALATION.

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#### ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MESSAGES OF WARNING.

6. BOTH OF THE ASSUMPTIONS ABOVE MAY BE TAKEN AS STARTING POINTS IN ASSESSING THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MESSAGES OF WARNING. THEY REPRESENT THE OPPOSITE POLES OF SOVIET BEHAVIOUR WHICH IN ACTUALITY MIGHT NOT BE SO CLEARLY DEFINABLE, AND MIGHT INDEED CHANGE FROM ONE TYPE TO THE OTHER DURING THE COURSE OF A CONFLICT.

(1) NPG/STUDY/46

(2) DPC/D(74)18, 5TH AUGUST 1974, ANNEX, VOLUME I, PARAGRAPH 6

(3) IDEM

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7. THE OBVIOUS ADVANTAGE OF A MESSAGE OF WARNING WOULD BE THAT IT MIGHT INDUCE THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO TAKE THE ACTION DESIRED BY THE ALLIANCE WITHOUT NATO'S INITIAL OR FURTHER RECOURSE TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS INDEED WOULD BE THE AIM OF A MESSAGE OF WARNING. SHOULD THE SOVIET APPROACH BE RIGIDLY CONSISTENT WITH THEIR ENUNCIATED DOCTRINE, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT A MESSAGE OF WARNING WOULD HAVE THE DESIRED EFFECT AND, INDEED, IT MIGHT WELL TRIGGER A PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK BY THE ENEMY. HOWEVER, THE CLARIFICATION OF NATO'S INTENTIONS IN A MESSAGE OF WARNING MIGHT RESULT IN SOVIET NUCLEAR USE AT A LOWER LEVEL THAN THAT OTHERWISE PREDICATED BY THEIR DOCTRINE. FURTHERMORE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT A FLEXIBLE AND CAUTIOUS SOVIET LEADERSHIP WOULD BE SWAYED BY A MESSAGE OF WARNING. THE MESSAGE MIGHT HAVE THE DESIRED EFFECT, FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WERE DIVIDED, WHEN A STRONG WARNING MIGHT TILT THE BALANCE TOWARDS SEEKING A POLITICAL SOLUTION. EVEN IN THE EVENT OF AN ENEMY DECISION ONLY TO CEASE HIS ADVANCE, NATO MIGHT GAIN SOME ADVANTAGE, IF ONLY TEMPORARY AND PARTIAL, TOWARDS ACHIEVING THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF RESTORING THE INTEGRITY OF THE ALLIANCE TERRITORY.

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8. AGAINST THE POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES MUST BE SET THE POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES. CLEARLY THE PRINCIPAL DANGER IN ANY ADVANCE WARNING IS OF CAUSING THE ENEMY TO PRE-EMPT AND TO INITIATE NUCLEAR ATTACKS. BUT THERE ARE OTHER POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES. A PURPOSELY DELAYED ENEMY RESPONSE, WITH ACCOMPANYING REQUESTS FOR EXTENDED DEADLINES COULD BE DESIGNED TO CAUSE NATO TO LOSE VALUABLE TIME WHILE THE CONVENTIONAL BATTLE WAS GOING FROM BAD TO WORSE. THE RESPONSE TO THE MESSAGE OF WARNING MIGHT BE PURPOSELY AMBIGUOUS OR DECEPTIVE, WITH THE AIM OF UNDERMINING ALLIANCE RESOLVE. THE ENEMY MIGHT RESPONSE PUBLICLY TO A SECRETLY DELIVERED MESSAGE OF WARNING, TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. THE ENEMY COULD ALSO TAKE MILITARY COUNTERMEASURES SHORT OF NUCLEAR PRE-EMPTION, SUCH AS DISPERSAL TO NEGATE OR LESSEN THE MILITARY EFFECTS OF NATO'S THREATENED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. FINALLY, USE OF A MESSAGE OF WARNING

COULD CONSTRAIN NATO FLEXIBILITY IN DECIDING ON THE TIMING, SCOPE AND LOCATION OF NUCLEAR USE.

#### TIMING AND SPECTRUM OF MESSAGES OF WARNING

9. MESSAGES OF WARNING MIGHT RANGE IN TIME FROM BEFORE OR AT THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES (AND THUS, PRESUMABLY, COUCHED IN GENERAL TERMS) UP TO THE STAGE OF A CONFLICT WHEN THE NUCLEAR POWER OR POWERS HAVE REACHED A FIRM DECISION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS (IN THIS CASE, THE MESSAGE WOULD PROBABLY BE CAST IN SPECIFIC AND BLUNT TERMS). WE PRESUME THAT NATO'S COMMUNICATIONS DURING A PERIOD OF TENSION OR OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES WOULD CONTAIN AT LEAST IMPLICIT WARNINGS OF THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR ESCALATION INHERENT IN THE CRISIS SITUATION (SIMILAR WARNINGS WOULD, OF COURSE, BE IMPLICIT IN MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS' ACTIONS RELATED TO THE NATO ALERT SYSTEM). THE NEED FOR CAREFUL CO-ORDINATION AND CONSISTENCY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE MUST BE PARAMOUNT FOR ALL CNI ACTION, AND THERE MUST BE NO DANGER OF MISINTERPRETATION EITHER IN THE DIRECTION OF EXAGGERATING ALLIANCE DEFENSIVE INTENTIONS OR OF SUGGESTING ANY WEAKNESS IN ALLIANCE RESOLVE. FURTHERMORE, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO AVOID A SITUATION WHERE THE ALLIANCE, IN THE EVENT OF ENEMY NON-COMPLIANCE, DID NOT LIVE UP TO ITS WARNINGS. THEREFORE, IT IS LIKELY THAT ANY MESSAGE OF WARNING CONTAINING AN EXPLICIT THREAT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE WOULD NEED TO BE CLOSELY RELATED TO A SPECIFIC DECISION BY THE NUCLEAR POWER(S) TO EMPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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#### CHANNELS FOR MESSAGES OF WARNING

10. A MESSAGE OF WARNING COULD BE ISSUED AS A COMMUNIQUE BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AND DISSEMINATED BY ALL PUBLIC MEANS AVAILABLE TO THE ALLIES. BY ALLOWING PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF THE MESSAGE OF WARNING SENT TO THE ENEMY, THE ALLIANCE MIGHT DEMONSTRATE - ESPECIALLY TO NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES - ITS DESIRE TO HOLD BACK FROM NUCLEAR WAR. ON THE OTHER HAND, THIS KIND OF PUBLICITY MIGHT NOT ALLOW THE ALLIANCE TO OFFER TO THE ENEMY FACE-SAVING DE-ESCALATORY OPTIONS, AND, THUS, A SECRET COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH SUCH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS AS WERE AVAILABLE, OR BY A NUCLEAR POWER'S HOTLINE, MAY BE PREFERABLE. WHEN A MESSAGE OF WARNING IS RELATED TO A SPECIFIC USE, DECISION, THE TIME FACTOR MAY BE CRITICAL AND THIS SUGGESTS THE NUCLEAR POWERS' HOTLINES MIGHT BE THE MOST PRACTICABLE CHANNEL. MOREOVER, A NUCLEAR POWER MESSAGE, ON BEHALF OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE, WOULD CARRY GREATEST WEIGHT.

#### CONSULTATION ON MESSAGES OF WARNING

11. IN VIEW OF THE AIM OF A MESSAGE OF WARNING AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TIMING AND NATURE OF SUCH A MESSAGE, A DECISION TO SEND A MESSAGE OF WARNING WOULD INVOLVE INTERACTION OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS AND WOULD BE HIGHLY DEPENDENT ON THE ACTUAL SITUATION. DISCUSSION OF A GENERAL MESSAGE OF WARNING, PARTICULARLY IF IT WAS TO BE SENT AT AN

EARLY STAGE OF THE CONFLICT, WOULD FIT INTO THE NORMAL PATTERN OF GENERAL ALLIANCE CONSULTATION. WHEN MESSAGES OF WARNING ARE LINKED TO A SPECIFIC NUCLEAR USE DECISION, CNI CONSULTATION SHOULD REFLECT THE SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NUCLEAR CONSULTATION PROCESS.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

12. THIS PAPER HAS IDENTIFIED POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MESSAGES OF WARNING, AND HAS CONSIDERED SOME RELATED PROCEDURAL ASPECTS. IN TIME OF CONFLICT NAC/DPC CONSIDERATION OF THE UTILITY, PURPOSE AND TIMING OF MESSAGES OF WARNING IS EXPECTED TO FORM PART OF THE ESTABLISHED PATTERN OF CONSULTATION.

IV. RECOMMENATIONS

13. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT MINISTERS:

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(A) TAKE NOTE OF THIS REPORT;

(B) DISCUSS THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MESSAGES OF WARNING ON THE BASIS OF THIS REPORT; AND

(C) AGREE THAT CONSULTATION REGARDING MESSAGES OF WARNING SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN FUTURE NATO EXERCISES. END TEXT.STREATOR

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